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Abstract. We describe a procedure for removing dependency on a co-
hort of training data from a trained deep network that improves upon
and generalizes previous methods to different readout functions, and can
be extended to ensure forgetting in the activations of the network. We
introduce a new bound on how much information can be extracted per
query about the forgotten cohort from a black-box network for which only
the input-output behavior is observed. The proposed forgetting proce-
dure has a deterministic part derived from the differential equations of a
linearized version of the model, and a stochastic part that ensures infor-
mation destruction by adding noise tailored to the geometry of the loss
landscape. We exploit the connections between the activation and weight
dynamics of a DNN inspired by Neural Tangent Kernels to compute the
information in the activations.
Keywords: Forgetting, data removal, differential privacy, neural tan-
gent kernel.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of removing information pertaining to a given set of data
points from the weights of a trained network, in such a way that a potential
attacker cannot recover information about the forgotten cohort. We consider
both the cases in which the attacker has full access to the weights of the trained
model, and the less-studied case where the attacker can only query the model by
observing some input data and the corresponding output, for instance through
an API. We show that we can quantify the maximum amount of information that
an attacker can extract from observing inputs and outputs (black-box attack),
as well as from direct knowledge of the weights (white-box), and propose tailored
procedures for removing such information from the trained model in one shot.
That is, assuming the model has been obtained by fine-tuning a pre-trained
generic backbone, we compute a single perturbation of the weights that, in one
go, can erase information about a cohort to be forgotten in such a way that an
attacker cannot access it.
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Fig. 1: Scrubbing procedure: PCA-projection of training paths on D (blue),
Dr (orange) and the weights after scrubbing, using (Left) The Fisher method
of [14], and (Right) the proposed scrubbing method. Our proposed scrubbing
procedure (red cross) moves the model towards w(Dr), which reduces the amount
of noise (point cloud) that needs to be added to achieve forgetting.
More formally, we can think of a dataset D as partitioned into a subset Df to
be forgotten, and its complement Dr to be retained, D = Df unionsq Dr. A (possibly
stochastic) training algorithm A takes Df and Dr and outputs a weight vector
w:
A(Df ,Dr)→ w.
Assuming an attacker knows the training algorithm A (e.g ., stochastic gradient
descent, or SGD), the weights w, and the retainable data Dr, she can exploit
their relationship to recover information about Df , at least for state-of-the-art
deep neural networks (DNNs). Recent work [14,15], introduces a “scrubbing
procedure” SDf (w) that attempts to remove information from the weights, i.e.,
A(Df ,Dr)→ w → SDf (w)
with an upper-bound on the amount of information about Df that can be ex-
tracted after the forgetting procedure, provided the attack has access to the
scrubbed weights SDf (w), a process called “white-box attack.”
However, bounding the information that can be extracted from a white-
box attack is often complex and may be overly restrictive: Deep networks have
large sets of equivalent solutions that would give the same activations on all
test samples. Changes in Df may change the position of the weights in the null
space. Hence, the position of the weight in the null-space, even if irrelevant for
the input-output behavior, may be exploited to recover information about Df .
This suggests that the study of forgetting should be approached from the
perspective of the activations, rather than the weights, since there could be in-
finitely many different models that produce the same input-output behavior, and
we are interested in preventing attacks that affect the behavior of the network,
rather than the specific solution to which the training process converged. More
precisely, denote by fw(x) the activations of a network on a sample x (for ex-
ample the softmax or pre-softmax vector). We assume that an attacker makes
queries on n images x = (x1, . . . , xn), and obtains the activations fw(x). The
pipeline then looks
A(Df ,Dr)→ w → S(w)→ fS(w)(x).
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The key question now is to determine how much information can an attacker
recover aboutDf , starting from the activations fS(w)(x)? We provide a new set of
bounds that quantifies the average information per query an attacker can extract
from the model. Interestingly, we show both in theory and experiments that
carefully chosen (adversarial) queries can extract much more information than
a random query. This has connections with the problem of model identifiability
and the issue of sufficient excitation.
The forgetting procedure we propose is obtained using the Neural Tangent
Kernel (NTK). We show that this forgetting procedure is able to handle the
null space of the weights better than previous approaches when using over-
parametrized models such as DNNs. In experiments, we confirm that it works
uniformly better than previous proposals on all forgetting metrics introduced,
both in the white-box and black-box case (Figure 1).
Note that one may think of forgetting in a black-box setting as just changing
the activations (e.g ., adding noise or hiding one class output) so that less infor-
mation can be extracted. This, however, is not proper forgetting as the model
still contains information, it is just not visible outside. We refer to forgetting as
removing information from the weights, but we provide bounds for how much
information can be extracted after scrubbing in the black-box case, and show
that they are order of magnitudes smaller than the corresponding bounds for
white boxes for the same target accuracy.
Key contributions: To summarize, our contributions are as follow:
1. We introduce methods to scrub information from, and analyze the content
of, deep networks from their activations (black-box attacks).
2. We introduce a “one-shot” forgetting algorithms that work better than pre-
vious methods for both white-box and black-box attacks.
3. This is possible thanks to an elegant connection between activations and
weights dynamics inspired by the neural tangent kernel (NTK), which allows
us to better deal with the null-space of the network weights. Unlike the NTK
formalism, we do not need to take any limit. However, if the NTK limit
happens to old, then our procedure is exact.
4. We show that better bounds can be obtained against black-box attacks than
white-box, which gives a better forgetting vs error trade-off curve.
2 Related work
Differential privacy [11] aims to learn the parameters of a model in such a way
that no information about any particular training sample can be recovered. This
is a much stronger requirement than forgetting, where we only want to remove
after training is done, information about a given subset of samples. Given the
stronger requirements, enforcing differential privacy is difficult for deep networks
and often results in significant loss of accuracy [1,9].
Forgetting: The term “machine unlearning” was introduced by [8], who shows
an efficient forgetting algorithm in the restricted setting of statistical query learn-
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ing, where the learning algorithm cannot access individual samples. [13] formal-
izes the problem of efficient data elimination, and provides engineering principles
for designing forgetting algorithms. However, they only provide a data deletion
algorithms for k-means clustering. [5] propose a forgetting procedure based on
sharding the dataset and training multiple models. Aside from the storage cost,
they need to retrain subset of the models, while we aim for one-shot forgetting.
[4] proposed a forgetting method for logit-based classification models by applying
linear transformation to the output logits, but do not remove information from
the weights. [15] formulates data removal mechanisms using differential privacy,
and provides an algorithm for convex problems based on a second order Newton
update. They suggest applying this method on top of the features learned by
a DNN, which however, cannot remove information that may be contained in
the network itself. Closer to us, [14] proposed a selective forgetting procedure
for deep neural networks trained with SGD, using an information theoretic for-
mulation and exploiting the stability of SGD [16]. They proposed a forgetting
mechanism which involves a shift in weight space, and addition of noise to the
weights to destroy information. They also provide an upper bound on the amount
of remaining information in the weights of the network after applying the forget-
ting procedure. We extend this framework to activations, and show that using
an NTK based scrubbing procedure uniformly improves the scrubbing procedure
in all metrics that they consider.
Membership Inference Attacks [32,19,17,26,29,30,27] try to guess if a par-
ticular sample was used for training a model. Since a model has forgotten only
if an attacker cannot guess at better than chance level, these attacks serve as
a good metric for measuring the quality of forgetting. In Figure 3 we construct
a black-box membership inference attack similar to the shadow model training
approach in [29]. Such methods relate to model inversion methods [12] which
aim to gain information about the training data from the model output.
Neural Tangent Kernel: [20,23] show that the training dynamics of a lin-
earized version of a Deep Network — which are described by the so called NTK
matrix — approximate increasingly better the actual training dynamics as the
network width goes to infinity. [3,24] extend the framework to convolutional
networks. [28] compute information-theoretic quantities using the closed form
expressions for various quantities that can be derived in this settings. While we
do use the infinite width assumption, we show that the same linearization frame-
work and solutions are a good approximation of the network dynamics during
fine-tuning, and use them to compute an optimal scrubbing procedure.
3 Out of the box forgetting
In this section, we derive an upper-bound for how much information can be
extracted by an attacker that has black-box access to the model, that is, they
can query the model with an image, and obtain the corresponding output.
While the problem itself may seem trivial — can the relation A(Df ,Dr) = w
be inverted to extract Df? — it is made more complex by the fact that the
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algorithm is stochastic, and that the map may not be invertible, but still partially
invertible, that is, only a subset of information aboutDf can be recovered. Hence,
we employ a more formal information-theoretic framework, inspired by [14] and
that in turns generalizes Differential Privacy [11].
There are two classes of bounds we can consider: an a-priori bound, which can
guarantees a given amount of forgetting even before starting the procedure, or
an a-posteriori bound, which compares the scrubbing with a reference optimal
model (usually more expensive to obtain than the scrubbed model) to bound
the information. While an a-priori bound is preferable, it requires very strong
assumptions on the data, the model, the loss landscape and the training proce-
dure. Such a bound is computed in [15] for linear models. A-posteriori bounds
are fundamental too: they provide tighter answers, and allow one to design and
benchmark scrubbing procedures even for very complex models such as deep net-
works, for which a-priori bounds would be impossible or vacuous. In this work,
we focus on a-posteriori bounds for Deep Networks and use them to design a
scrubbing procedure.
3.1 Information Theoretic formalism
We start by modifying the framework of [14], developed for the weights of a
network, to the activations. We expect an adversary to use a readout function
applied to the activations. Given a set of images x = (x0, . . . , xn), we denote
by fw(x) = (f(x0), . . . , f(xm)) the concatenation of their respective activations.
Let Df be the set of training data to forget, and let y be some function of Df that
an attacker wants to reconstruct (i.e., y is some piece of information regarding
the samples). To keep the notation uncluttered, we write SDf (w) = S(w) for the
scrubbing procedure to forget Df . We then have the following Markov chain
y ←− Df −→ w −→ S(w) −→ fS(w)(x)
connecting all quantities. Using the Data Processing Inequality [10] we have the
following inequalities:
I(y; fS(w)(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Recovered information
≤ I(Df ; fS(w)(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Black-box upper bound
≤ I(Df ;S(w))︸ ︷︷ ︸
White box upper-bound
. (1)
Bounding the last term — which is a general bound on how much information
an attacker with full access to the weights could extract — is the focus of [14].
In this work, we also consider the case where the attacker can only access the
activations, and hence focus on the central term. As we will show, if the number
of queries is bounded then the central term provides a sharper bound compared
to the black-box case.
3.2 Bound for activations
The mutual information in the central term is difficult to compute,1 but in our
case has a simple upper-bound:
1 Indeed, it is even difficult to define, as the quantities at play, Df and x, are fixed
values, but that problem has been addressed by [2] and we do not consider it here.
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Lemma 1 (Computable bound on mutual information). We have the
following upper bound:
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) ≤ EDf
[
KL
(
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr) ‖ p(fS0(w)(x)|Dr)
)]
, (2)
where p(fS(w)(x)|D = Df ∪ Dr) is the distribution of activations after training
on the complete dataset Df unionsqDr and scrubbing. Similarly, p(fS0(w)(x)|D = Dr)
is the distribution of possible activations after training only on the data to retain
Dr and applying a function S0 (that does not depend on Df ) to the weights.
The lemma introduces the important notion that we can estimate how much
information we erased by comparing the activations of our model with the acti-
vations of a reference model that was trained in the same setting, but without
Df . Clearly, if the activations after scrubbing are identical to the activations of
a model that has never seen Df , they cannot contain information about Df .
We now want to convert this bound in a more practical expected information
gain per query. This is not yet trivial due to them stochastic dependency of w
on D: based on the random seed  used to train, we may obtain very different
weights for the same dataset. Reasoning in a way similar to that used to obtain
the local forgetting bound of [14], we can write:
Lemma 2. Write a stochastic training algorithm A as A(D, ), where  is the
random seed and A(D, ) is a deterministic function. Then, we have the following
lemma.
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) ≤ EDf ,
[
KL
(
p(fS(wD)(x)) ‖ p(fS0(wDr )(x))
)]
(3)
where we call wD = A(D, ) the deterministic result of training on the dataset
D using random seed . The probability distribution inside the KL accounts only
for the stochasticity of the scrubbing map S(wD) and the baseline S0(wDr ).
The expression above is general. To gain some insight, it is useful to write it for
a special case where scrubbing is performed by adding Gaussian noise.
3.3 Close form bound for Gaussian scrubbing
We start by considering a particular class of scrubbing functions S(w) in the
form
S(w) = h(w) + n, n ∼ N(0, Σ(w,D)) (4)
where h(w) is a deterministic shift (that depends on D, Df and w) and n is
Gaussian noise with a given covariance (which may also depend on w and D). We
consider a baseline S0(w) = w+n
′ in a similar form, where n′ ∼ N(0, Σ0(w,Dr)).
Assuming that the covariance of the noise is relatively small, so that fh(w)(x)
is approximately linear in w in a neighborhood of h(w) (we drop D without loss of
generality), we can easily derive the following approximation for the distribution
of the activations after scrubbing for a given random seed :
fS(wD)(x) ∼ N(fh(wD)(x),∇wfh(wD)(x)Σ∇wfh(wD)(x)T ) (5)
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where ∇wfh(wD)(x) is the matrix whose row is the gradient of the activations
with respect to the weights, for each sample in x. Having an explicit (Gaussian)
distribution for the activations, we can plug it in Lemma 2 and obtain:
Proposition 1. For a Gaussian scrubbing procedure, we have the bounds:
I(Df ;S(w)) ≤ EDf ,
[
∆wTΣ0
−1∆w + d(Σ,Σ0)
]
(white-box) (6)
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) ≤ EDf ,
[
∆fTΣ′x
−1
∆f + d(Σx, Σ
′
x)
]
(black-box) (7)
where d(Σ,Σ0) := tr(ΣΣ
−1
0 ) + log |ΣΣ−10 | − k for Σ a k × k matrix, and we
defined:
∆w := h(wD)− wDr , ∆f := fh(wD)(x)− fwDr (x)
Σx := ∇wfh(wD)(x)Σ∇wfh(wD)(x)T , Σ′x := ∇wfwDr (x)Σ0∇wfwDr (x)T .
Avoiding curse of dimensionality: There are a few interesting things to no-
tice in Proposition 1. Comparing eq. (6) and eq. (7), we see that the bound
in eq. (6) involves variables of the same dimension as the number of weights,
while eq. (7) scales with the number of query points. Hence, for highly over-
parametrized models such as DNNs, we expect that the black-box bound in
eq. (7) will be much smaller if the number of queries is bounded, which indeed
is what we observe in the experiments (Figure 4).
Blessing of the null-space: The white-box bound depends on the difference
∆w in weight space between the scrubbed model and the reference model wDr ,
while the black-box bound depends on the distance ∆f in the activations. As we
mentioned in Section 1, over-parametrized models such as deep networks have
a large null-space of weights with similar activations. It may hence happen that
even if ∆w is large, ∆f may still be small (and hence the bound in eq. (7)
tighter) as long as ∆w lives in the null-space. Indeed, we often observe this to
be the case in our experiments.
Adversarial queries: Finally, this should not lead us to think that whenever
the activations are similar, little information can be extracted. Notice that the
relevant quantity for the black box bound is ∆f(JxΣ0J
T
x )
−1∆fT , which involves
also the gradient Jx = ∇wfwDr (x). Hence, if an attacker crafts an adversarial
query x such that its gradient Jx is small, they may be able to extract a large
amount of information even if the activations are close to each other. In partic-
ular, this happens if the gradient of the samples lives in the null-space of the
reference model, but not in that of the scrubbed model. In Figure 4 (right), we
show that indeed different images can extract different amount of information.
4 An NTK-inspired forgetting procedure
We now introduce a new scrubbing procedure, which aims to minimize both the
white-box and black-box bounds of Proposition 1. It relates to the one introduced
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Fig. 2: (Right) The loss landscape and training dynamics after pre-
training are smooth and regular. This justifies our linearization approach
to study the dynamics. The black and yellow lines are the training paths on D
and Dr respectively. Notice that they remain close. (Upper left) Loss along
the line joining the model at initialization (α = 0) and the model after training
on D (α = 1) (the black path). (Lower left) Loss along the line joining the end
point of the two paths (α = 0 and 1 respectively), which is the ideal scrubbing
direction.
in [14,15], but it enjoys better numerical properties and can be computed without
approximations (Section 4.1). In Section 5 we show that it gives better results
under all commonly used metrics.
The main intuition we exploit is that most networks commonly used are fine-
tuned from pre-trained networks (e.g ., on ImageNet), and that the weights do
not move much during fine-tuning on D = Dr ∪Df will remain close to the pre-
trained values. In this regime, the network activations may be approximated as a
linear function of the weights. This is justified by a growing literature on the the
so called Neural Tangent Kernel, which posits that large networks during training
evolve in the same way as their linear approximation. Using the linearized model
we can derive an analytical expression for the optimal forgetting function, which
we validate empirically. However, we observe this to be misaligned with weights
actually learned by SGD, and introduce a very simple “isoceles trapezium” trick
to realign the solutions (Supplementary Material).
Using the same notation as [23], we linearize the activations around the pre-
trained weights θ0 as:
f lint (x) ≡ f0(x) +∇θf0(x)|θ=θ0wt
which gives the following expected training dynamics for respectively the weights
and the activations:
w˙t = −η∇θf0(D)T∇f lint (D)L (8)
f˙ lint (x) = −ηΘ0(x,D)∇f lint (D)L (9)
Forgetting outside the box 9
The matrix Θ0 = ∇wf(D)∇wf(D)T of size c|D| × c|D|, where c the number
of classes, is called the Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK) matrix [23,20]. Using
this dynamics, we can approximate in closed form the final training point when
training with D and Dr, and compute the optimal “one-shot forgetting” vector
to jump from one to the other:
Proposition 2. Assuming an L2 regression loss,
2 the optimal scrubbing proce-
dure under the NTK approximation is given by
hNTK(w) = w + P∇f0(Df )TMV (10)
where ∇f0(Df )T is the matrix whose columns are the gradients of the sample to
forget, computed at w0. P = I −∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ∇f0(Dr) is a projection matrix,
that projects the gradients of the samples to forget ∇f0(Df ) onto the orthogonal
space to the space spanned by the gradients of all samples to retain. The terms
M =
[
Θff − ΘTrfΘ−1rr Θrf
]−1
and V = [(Yf − f0(Df )) + ΘTrfΘ−1rr (Yr − f0(Dr))]
re-weight each direction before summing them together.
Given this result, our proposed scrubbing procedure is:
SNTK(w) = hNTK(w) + n (11)
where hNTK(w) is as in eq. (10), and we use noise n ∼ N(0, λF−1) where F =
F (w) is the Fisher Information Matrix computed at w. The noise model is as
in [14], and is designed to increase robustness to mistakes due to the linear
approximation.
4.1 Relation between NTK and Fisher forgetting
In [14] and [15], a different forgetting approach is suggested based on either
the Hessian or the Fisher Matrix at the final point: assuming that the solutions
w(Dr) and w(D) of training with and without the data to forget are close and
that they are both minima of their respective loss, one may compute the shift to
to jump from one minimum to the other of a slightly perturbed loss landscape.
The resulting “scrubbing shift” w 7→ h(w) relates to the newton update:
h(w) = w −H(Dr)−1∇wLDr (w). (12)
In the case of an L2 loss, and using the NTK model, the Hessian is given by
H(w) = ∇f0(Dr)T∇f0(Dr) which in this case also coincides with the Fisher
Matrix [25]. To see how this relates to the NTK matrix, consider deterimining
the convergence point of the linearized NTK model, that for an L2 regression is
given by w∗ = w0 +∇f0(Dr)+ Y, where ∇f0(Dr)+ denotes the matrix pseudo-
inverse, and Y denotes the regression targets. If ∇f0(Dr) is a tall matrix (more
2 This assumption is to keep the expression simple, in the Supplementary Material we
show the corresponding expression for a softmax classification loss.
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samples in the dataset than parameters in the network), then the pseudo-inverse
is ∇f0(Dr)+ = H−1∇f0(Dr)T , recovering the scrubbing procedure considered
by [14,15]. However, if the matrix is wide (more parameters than samples in the
network, as is often the case in Deep Learning), the Hessian is not invertible, and
the pseudo-inverse is instead given by ∇f0(Dr)+ = ∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1, leading to
our proposed procedure. In general, when the model is over-parametrized there
is a large null-space of weights that do not change the activations or the loss.
The degenerate Hessian is not informative of where the network will converge in
this null-space, while the NTK matrix gives the exact point.
5 Experiments
5.1 Datasets
We report experiments on smaller versions of CIFAR-10 [22] and Lacuna-10 [14],
a dataset derived from the VGG-Faces [7] dataset. We obtain the small datasets
using the following procedure: we randomly sample 500 images (100 images from
each of the first 5 classes) from the training/test set of CIFAR-10 and Lacuna-10
to obtain the small-training/test respectively. We also sample 125 images from
the training set (5 classes × 25 images) to get the validation set. So, in short,
we have 500 (5 × 100) examples for training and testing repectively, and 125
(5 × 25) examples for validation. On both the datasets we choose to forget 25
random samples (5% of the dataset). Without loss of generality we choose to
forget samples from class 0.
5.2 Models and Training
We use All-CNN [31] (add batch-normalization before non-linearity) and ResNet-
18 [18] as the deep neural networks for our experiments. We pre-train the models
on CIFAR-100/Lacuna-100 and then fine-tune them (all the weights) on CIFAR-
10/Lacuna-10. We pre-train using SGD for 30 epochs with a learning rate of 0.1,
momentum 0.9 and weight decay 0.0005. Pre-training helps in improving the
stability of SGD while fine-tuning. For fine-tuning we use a learning rate of
0.01 and weight decay 0.1. While applying weight decay we bias the weights
with respect to the initialization. During training we always use a batch-size of
128 and fine-tune the models till zero training error. Also, during fine-tuning
we do not update the running mean and variance of the batch-normalization
parameters to simplify the training dynamics. We perform each experiment 3
times and report the mean and standard deviation.
5.3 Baselines
We consider three baselines for comparison: (i) Fine-tune, we fine-tune w(D) on
Dr (similar to catastrophic forgetting) and (ii) Fisher forgetting [14], we scrubs
the weights by adding Gaussian noise using the inverse of the Fisher Information
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Fig. 3: Comparison of different models baselines (original, finetune) and forget-
ting methods (Fisher [14] and our NTK proposed method), using several readout
functions ((Top) CIFAR and (Bottom) Lacuna). We benchmark them against
a model that has never seen the data (the gold reference for forgetting): values
(mean and standard deviation) measured from this models corresponds to the
green region. Optimal scrubbing procedure should lie in the green region, or
they will leak information about Df . We compute three read-out functions: (a)
Error on forget set Df , (b) Error on retain set Dr, (c) Error on test set Dtest.
(d) Black-box membership inference attack: We construct a simple yet effective
membership attack using the entropy of the output probabilities. We measures
how often the attack model (using the activations of the scrubbed network)
classify a sample belonging Df as a training sample rather than being fooled
by the scrubbing. (e) Re-learn time for different scrubbing methods: How fast
a scrubbed model learns the forgotten cohort when fine-tuned on the complete
dataset. We measure the re-learn time as the first epoch when the loss on Df
goes below a certain threshold.
Matrix as covariance matrix, (iii) Original corresponds to the original model
trained on the complete dataset (w(D)) without any forgetting. We compare
those, and our proposal, with optimal reference the model w(Dr) trained from
scratch on the retain set, that is, without using Df in the first place. Values
read from this reference model corresponds to the green region in Figure 3 and
represent the gold standard for forgetting: In those plots, an optimal algorithm
should lie inside the green area.
5.4 Readout Functions
We use multiple readout functions similar to [14]: (i) Error on residual (should
be small), (ii) Error on cohort to forget (should be similar to the model re-
trained from scratch on Dr), (iii) Error on test set (should be small), (iv) Re-
learn time, measures how quickly a scrubbed model learns the cohort to forget,
when fine-tuned on the complete data. Re-learn time (measured in epochs) is
the first epoch when the loss during fine-tuning (the scrubbed model) falls below
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Fig. 4: Error-forgetting trade-off Using the proposed scrubbing procedure,
by changing the variance of the noise, we can reduce the remaining information
in the weights (white-box bound, left) and activations (black-box bound,
center). However, it comes at the cost of increasing the test error. Notice that
the bound on activation is much sharper than the bound on error at the same ac-
curacy. (Right) Different samples leak different information. An attacker
querying samples from Df can gain much more information than querying unre-
lated images. This suggest that adversarial samples may be created to leak even
more information.
a certain threshold (loss of the original model (model trained on D) on Df ).
(v) Blackbox membership inference attack: We construct a simple yet
effective blackbox membership inference attack using the entropy of the output
probabilities of the scrubbed model. Similar to the method in [29], we formulate
the attack as a binary classification problem (class 1 - belongs to training set
and class 0 - belongs to test set). For training the attack model (Support Vector
Classifier with Radial Basis Function Kernel) we use the retain set (Dr) as class
1 and the test set as class 0. We test the success of the attack on the cohort
to forget (Df ). Ideally, the attack accuracy for an optimally scrubbed model
should be the same as a model re-trained from scratch on Df , having a higher
value implies incorrect (or no) scrubbing, while a lower value may result in
Streisand Effect, (vi) Remaining information in the weights [14] and (vii)
Remaining information in the activations: We compute an upper bound
on the information the activations contain about the cohort to forget (Df ) (after
scrubbing) when queried with images from different subsets of the data (Dr, Dr).
5.5 Results
Error readouts: In Figure 3 (a-c), we compare error based readout functions
for different forgetting methods. Our proposed method outperforms Fisher for-
getting which incurs high error on the retain (Dr) and test (DTest) set to attain
the same level of forgetting. This is due the large distance between w(D) and
w(Dr) in weight space, which forces it to add too much noise to erase information
about Df , and ends up also erasing information about the retain set Dr (high
error on Dr in Figure 3). Instead, our proposed method first moves w(D) in the
direction of w(Dr), thus minimizing the amount of noise to be added (Figure 1).
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Fig. 5: Scrubbing brings activations closer to the target. We plot the L1
norm of the difference between the final activations (post-softmax) of the target
model trained only on Dr, and models sampled along the line joining the original
model w(D) (α = 0) and the proposed scrubbed model (α = 1). The distance
between the activations decreases as we move along the scrubbing direction. The
L1 distance is already low on the retain set (Dr) (red) as it corresponds to the
data common to w(D) and w(Dr). However, the two models differ on the forget
set (Df ) (blue) and we observe that the L1 distance decreases as move along the
proposed scrubbing direction.
Fine-tuning the model on Dr (catastrophic forgetting) does not actually remove
information from the weights and performs poorly on all the readout functions.
Relearn time: In Figure 3 (d), we compare the re-learn time for different meth-
ods. Re-learn time can be considered as a proxy for the information remaining
in the weights about the cohort to forget (Df ) after scrubbing. We observe that
the proposed method outperforms all the baselines which is in accordance with
the previous observations (in Figure 3(a-c)).
Membership attacks: In Figure 3 (e), we compare the robustness of different
scrubbed models against blackbox membership inference attacks (attack aims to
identify if the scrubbed model was ever trained on Df ). This can be considered as
a proxy for the remaining information (about Df ) in the activations. We observe
that attack accuracy for the proposed method lies in the optimal region (green),
while Fine-tune does not forget (Df ), Fisher forgetting may result in Streisand
effect which is undesireable.
Closeness of activations: In Figure 5, we show that the proposed scrub-
bing method brings the activations of the scrubbed model closer to retrain
model (model retrained from scratch on Dr). We measure the closeness by com-
puting: Ex∼Df/Dr
[‖fscrubbed(x) − fretrain(x)‖1] along the scrubbing direction,
where fscrubbed(x), fretrain(x) are the activations (post soft-max) of the proposed
scrubbed and retrain model respectively. The distance between the activations
on the cohort to forget (Df ) decreases as we move along the scrubbing direction
and achieves a minimum value at the scrubbed model, while it almost remains
constant on the retain set. Thus, the activations of the scrubbed model shows
desirable behaviour on both Dr and Df .
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Error-forgetting trade-off In Figure 4, we plot the trade-off between the test
error and the remaining information in the weights and activations respectively
by changing the scale of the variance of Fisher noise. We can reduce the re-
maining information but this comes at the cost of increasing the test error. We
observe that the black-box bound on the information accessible with one query is
much tighter than the white box bound at the same accuracy (compare left and
center plot x-axes). Finally, in (right), we show that query samples belonging
to the cohort to be forgotten (Df ) leaks more information about the Df rather
than the retain/test set, proving that indeed carefully selected samples are more
informative to an attacker than random samples.
6 Discussion
Recent work [2,14,15] has started providing insights on both the amount of in-
formation that can be extracted from the weights about a particular cohort of
the data used for training, as well as give constructive algorithms to “selectively
forget.” Note that forgetting alone could be trivially obtained by replacing the
model with a random vector generator, obviously to the detriment of perfor-
mance, or by retraining the model from scratch, to the detriment of (training
time) complexity. In some cases, the data to be retained may no longer be avail-
able, so the latter may not even be an option.
We introduce a scrubbing procedure based on the NTK linearization which is
designed to minimize both a white-box bound (which assumes the attacker has
the weights), and a newly introduced black-box bound. The latter is a bound
on the information that can be obtained about a cohort using only the observed
input-output behavior of the network. This is relevant when the attacker per-
forms a bounded number of queries. If the attacker is allowed infinitely many
observations, the matter of whether the black-box and white-box attack are
equivalent remains open: Can an attacker always craft sufficiently exciting in-
puts so that the exact values of all the weights can be inferred? An answer would
be akin to a generalized “Kalman Decomposition” for deep networks. This alone
is an interesting open problem, as it has been pointed out recently that good
“clone models” can be created by copying the response of a black-box model on
a relatively small set of exciting inputs, at least in the restricted cases where
every model is fine-tuned from a common pre-trained models [21].
While our bounds are tighter that others proposed in the literature, our
model has limitations. Chiefly, computational complexity. The main source of
computational complexity is computing and storing the matrix P in eq. (10),
which naively would require O(|Dr|2) memory and O(|w| · |Dr|2) time. For this
reason, we conduct experiments on a relatively small scale, sufficient to validate
the theoretical results, but our method is not yet scalable to production level.
However, we notice that P is the projection matrix on the orthogonal of the
subspace spanned by the training samples, and there is a long history [6] of
numerical methods to incrementally compute such operator incrementally and
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without storing it fully in memory. We leave these promising option to scale the
method as subject of future investigation.
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Supplementary Material
In the Supplementary Material we:
– Appendix A: Provide proofs for all propositions and equations in the paper;
– Appendix B: Provide implementation details for our scrubbing procedure;
– Appendix C: Show further experiments on more datasets (CIFAR-10, La-
cuna, TinyImagenet) and models (AllCNN, ResNet).
A Proofs
Markov chain in Section 3.1. We consider the retain set Dr (not shown) as
an observed random variable, while the cohort to forget Df is an hidden variable
sampled randomly from the data distribution. The directed edge Df → w in the
Markov chain derives from the fact that we first sample Df , to obtain the full
complete training set D = Dr unionsq Df , and then train the network on D to obtain
the weights w.
Proof of Lemma 1. We have the following upper-bound for I(Df ; fS(w)(x)):
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) = I(Df ; fS(w)(x))
= EDf
[
KL
(
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr) ‖ p(fS0(w)(x))
)]
= EDfEp(fS(w)(x)|Df∪Dr)
[
log
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr)
p(fS0(w)(x))
]
= EDfEp(fS(w)(x)|Df∪Dr)
[
log
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr)
p(fS0(w)(x)|Dr)
+ log
p(fS0(w)(x)|Dr)
p(fS0(w)(x))
]
= EDf
[
KL
(
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr) ‖ p(fS(w)(x)|Dr)
)]
−KL (p(fS0(w)(x)) ‖ p(fS(w)(x)|Dr))
≤ EDf
[
KL
(
p(fS(w)(x)|Df ∪ Dr) ‖ p(fS0(w)(x)|Dr)
)]
where the last inequality follows from the fact that KL-divergence is always
non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 2. We have the inequalities:
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) ≤ EDf
[
KL
(
p(fS(wD)(x)) ‖ p(fS0(wDr )(x))
)]
≤ EDf ,
[
KL
(
p(fS(wD)(x)) ‖ p(fS0(wDr )(x))
)]
where the first inequality comes from Lemma 1, and the second inequality is
from [14, Proposition 2].
Proof of eq. (5). The activations of a scrubbed network (using the Gaussian
scrubbing procedure in eq. (4)) for a given sample x are given by fh(w)+n(x),
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where n ∼ N(0, Σ). By linearizing the activations (using NTK formalism)
around h(w), we obtain the distribution of the scrubbed activations:
fh(w)+n(x) ∼ N(fh(w)(x),∇wfh(w)(x)Σ∇wfh(w)(x)T )
For the original model we compute this at w = wD and take h to be the the
NTK scrubbing shift in eq. (10). The baseline model does not use any shift, so
h(w) = w, and is computed at w = wDr .
Proof of Proposition 1, eq. (6). As in [14, Example 2].
Proof of Proposition 1, eq. (7). Using Equation (5) we write the distribution
of the activations of a scrubbed network:
fS(wD)(x) ∼ N(fh(wD)(x), JΣJT )
where J = ∇wfh(wD)(x). We can similarly write the activations for baseline as:
fS0(wDr )(x) ∼ N(fwDr (x), J ′Σ0J ′T )
where J ′ = ∇wfwDr (x) Using the two distributions, we rewrite the bound in
Lemma 2 as:
I(Df ; fS(w)(x)) ≤ EDf ,
[
KL
(
N(fh(wD)(x), JΣJ
T ) ‖N(fwDr (x), J ′Σ0J ′T
)]
= EDf ,
[
∆fTΣ′x
−1
∆f + tr(ΣxΣ
′
x
−1
)− log |ΣxΣ′x−1| − n
]
where ∆f = fh(wD)(x) − fwDr (x), Σx = JΣJT , Σ′x = J ′Σ0J ′T , and we used
the closed form expression for the KL divergence of two normal distributions.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let D = Dr ∪ Df be the complete training set.
To keep the notation simpler, we assume that the loss is an mean-square-error
regression loss (we discuss classification using cross-entropy in Appendix B).
Let w0 be the weights obtained after pre-training on Dpre-train. Taking inspi-
ration from the NTK analysis [20,23] we approximate the activations fw(x) for
a test datum x after fine-tuning on D using the liner approximation f linw (x) =
fw0(x) +∇wfw0(x)(w − w0). To keep the notation uncluttered, we write f0(x)
instead of fw0(x).
The training dynamics under the linear approximation (assuming continuous
gradient descent) are then given by eq. (8) and (9), and will converge at the final
solution (see [23] for more details):
wlin(D) = ∇f0(D)TΘ−1(f0(D)− Y ) + w0.
Here ∇f0(D) ∈ RNc×p is the gradient of the output with respect to the parame-
ters (at initialization) for all the samples in D stacked along the rows to form a
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matrix (p is the number of parameters in the model, N = |D| and c is the num-
ber of classes), Θ = ∇f0(D)∇f0(D)T (∈ RNc×Nc) is the NTK matrix. Similarly,
Y is the matrix formed by stacking all ground-truth labels one below the other
and f0(D) ∈ R(Nc×1) are the stacked outputs of the DNN at initialization on D.
Similarly the baseline solution (training only on the data to retain) is:
wlin(Dr) = ∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr (f0(Dr)− Yr) + w0,
where Θrr = ∇f0(Dr)T∇f0(Dr). The optimal scrubbing vector (at least for the
linearized model) would then be δw := wlin(Dr) − wlin(D): adding δw to the
weights obtained by training on D makes us forget the extra examples (Df ), so
that we obtain weights equivalent to training on Dr alone. We now derive the
simplified expression in eq. (10) for the optimal scrubbing vector δw. We start
by rewriting wlin(D) using block matrixes:
wlin(D) = ∇f0(D)TΘ−1(f0(D)− Y ) + w0
=
[
∇f0(Dr)T∇f0(Df )T
][Θrr Θrf
ΘTrf Θff
]−1 [
f0(Dr)− Yr
f0(Df )− Yf
]
+ w0
We can expand the inverse of the NTK matrix using the following equations:[
Θrr Θrf
ΘTrf Θff
]−1
=
[[
Θrr −ΘrfΘ−1ff ΘTrf
]−1
−Θ−1rr ΘrfM
−MΘTrfΘ−1rr M
]
Where M =
[
Θff −ΘTrfΘ−1rr Θrf
]−1
. Using Woodbury Matrix Identity:
(A+ UCV )−1 = A−1 −A−1U(C−1 + V A−1U)−1V A−1
We obtain: [
Θrr −ΘrfΘ−1ff ΘTrf
]−1
= Θ−1rr +Θ
−1
rr ΘrfMΘ
T
rfΘ
−1
rr
Thus, [
Θrr Θrf
ΘTrf Θff
]−1
=
[
Θ−1rr +Θ
−1
rr ΘrfMΘ
T
rfΘ
−1
rr −Θ−1rr ΘrfM
−MΘTrfΘ−1rr M
]
Using the above relation we get
wlin(D) = ∇f0(Dr)T
(
Θ−1rr +Θ
−1
rr ΘrfMΘ
T
rfΘ
−1
rr
)
(f0(Dr)− Yr)
−∇f0(Df )TMΘTrfΘ−1rr (f0(Dr)− Yr)
−∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ΘrfM(f0(Df )− Yf )
+∇f0(Df )TM(f0(Df )− Yf ) + w0.
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Fig. 1: Isosceles Trapezium Trick: ‖w(Dr) − w(D)‖ = ‖wlin(Dr) − wlin(D)‖ +
2 sinα‖wlin(D)−w(D)‖. This allows us to match outputs of the linear dynamic
model with the real output, without having to match the effective learning rate
of the two, and while being more robust to wrong estimation of the curvature
by the linearized model.
Finally, using this the optimal shift δw for scrubbing the weights is
∆w = wlin(Dr)− wlin(D)
= −∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ΘrfMΘTrfΘ−1rr (f0(Dr)− Yr)
+∇f0(Df )TMΘTrfΘ−1rr (f0(Dr)− Yr)
+∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ΘrfM(f0(Df )− Yf )
−∇f0(Df )TM(f0(Df )− Yf )
=
[
I −∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ∇f0(Dr)
]
∇f0(Df )TM
[
ΘTrfΘ
−1
rr (f0(Dr)− Yr)
]
+
[
I −∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ∇f0(Dr)
]
∇f0(Df )TM
[
(Yf − f0(Df ))
]
= P∇f0(Df )TMV,
where P = I − ∇f0(Dr)TΘ−1rr ∇f0(Dr), M =
[
Θff − ΘTrfΘ−1rr Θrf
]−1
and V =
[(Yf − f0(Df )) +ΘTrfΘ−1rr (Yr − f0(Dr))].
B Experimental Details
We train our models with SGD (learning rate η = 0.01 and momentum m = 0.9)
using weight decay (λ = 0.1). All models are trained to convergence (we stop
the training 5 epochs after the model achieves zero training error).
Pre-training and weight-decay. In all cases, we use pre-trained models (we
pre-train the models on CIFAR-100/Lacuna-100/TinyImageNet (first 150 classes)
respectively), and denote by w0 the pre-trained weight configuration. One im-
portant point is that we change the weight decay regularization term from the
standard ‖w‖22 (which pulls the weights toward zero) to ‖w−w0‖22 (which pulls
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the weights toward the initialization). This serves two purposes, (i) It ensures
that the weights remain close to the initialization (in our case, a pre-trained
network). This further helps the weight during training to remain in the neigh-
borhood of the initialization where the the linear approximation (NTK) is good;
(ii) With this change, the training dynamics of the weights/activations of a lin-
earized network only depend on the relative change in the weights from its initial
value (see [23, Section 2.2 ] for more details).
NTK matrix, weight decay and cross-entropy. For clarity, in Section 4
and Proposition 2 we only considered a unregularized MSE regression problem.
To apply the theory to the more practical case of a classification cross-entropy
loss with weight-decay regularization, we need the following changes.
First, using weight decay the NTK matrix becomes Θ = ∇f0(D)∇f0(D)T +
λI, where λ is the weight decay coefficient. Second, when using the cross-
entropy loss, the gradients ∇f lint (D)L of the loss function can be approximated
as ∇fw(x)L ≈ ∇fw0(x)L + Hfw0 (x)(fw(x) − fw0(x)), where Hfw0 (x) is the Hes-
sian of the loss with respect to the output activations. With these two together,
we obtain Θ = Hfw0 (x)∇f0(D)∇f0(D)
T
+ λI as the NTK matrix to use in our
setting.
We did however notice that replacing Hfw0 (x) with the identity matrix I
works better in practice. This may be due to Hfw0 (x) estimating the wrong
curvature when the softmax saturates. Also we found that — while in princi-
ple identical as long as the network remains in the linear regime — linearizing
around w(D) provides a better estimate of the scrubbing direction compared to
linearizing around w0.
Trapezium trick. We observe that the linearized dynamics of in eq. (8) and
eq. (9) correctly approximate the training direction but they usually undershoot
and give a smaller norm solution than SGD. This may be due to difficulty in
matching the learning rate of continuous gradient descent and discrete SGD. To
overstep these issues in a robust way, we use the following simple “trapezium
trick” (Figure 1) to renormalize the scrubbing vector obtained with the linear
dynamics: Instead of trying to predicting the unknown w(Dr) directly using the
scrubbing vector suggested by eq. (10), we compute the two final points of the lin-
earized dynamics wlin(D) and wlin(Dr), and approximate w(Dr) by constructing
the isosceles trapezium in Figure 1. Effectively, this rescales the ideal linearized
forgetting direction wlin(Dr)− wlin(D) to correct for the undershooting.
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C Additional Experiments
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Fig. 2: Same experiment as Figure 3 for different architectures and datasets.
(Row 1): ResNet-18 on CIFAR, (Row 2): ResNet-18 on Lacuna, (Row 3):
All-CNN on TinyImageNet and (Row 4): ResNet-18 on TinyImageNet. In all
the experiments we observe that for different readout functions the proposed
method lies in the green (target) region.
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Fig. 3: Same experiment as Figure 4 for different architectures and datasets.
(Row-1): ResNet-18 on CIFAR, (Row-2): ResNet-18 on Lacuna, (Row-3):
All-CNN on TinyImageNet, (Row-4): ResNet-18 on TinyImageNet. We observe
consistent behaviour across different architectures and datasets.
